Friends in Christ
“I do not call you servants any longer,
because the servant does not know what the master is doing; but I have called
you friends, because I have made known to you everything that I have heard from
my Father.” John 15:15
The
Reverend Luther Zeigler
Christ
Church Cambridge
6
Easter 2012
I take as my text this morning the 15th verse of
the 15th chapter of John, where Jesus for the first time
calls his disciples “friends” and invites them into friendship with himself and
with each other. No longer are they servants, bound by a law that
constrains, but now they are friends, bound instead by a love that
abides. Jesus reminds his disciples that long before they chose to follow
him, he chose them as his beloved friends, not because they deserve such favor,
but rather out of an extravagant and indiscriminate love that desires nothing
other than their complete joy.
There is a great risk here, I realize, of falling
into an easy sentimentality with all this talk of love and friendship, as
countless country and western songs with titles like “You’ve got a friend in
Jesus” can attest. I hope we can avoid that danger, and probe just a bit
deeper into the nature of Christian friendship, but the proof will be in the
pudding, as they say. My aim is to suggest that something really quite
revolutionary is taking place when Jesus creates a community of “friends” in
John’s gospel, that Jesus is using the word “friend” in a radically new way,
and that the “friendship” Jesus has in mind for his followers is nothing less
than a glimpse of the Kingdom of God.
But let me start with a more modest
observation: When Jesus uses the word “friend” in the first century of
the Common Era, he was by no means writing on a blank slate. The
Hellenistic culture that shaped Jesus’ time in fact had a rich and nuanced
understanding of “friendship,” expressed nowhere more eloquently than by Aristotle
in his Nicomachean Ethics. Indeed, the vital role of friendship in
the ancient world is evidenced by the simple fact that Aristotle’s classic
treatise on ethics devotes two of its ten books to the topic. “No one,”
Aristotle writes, “would choose to live without friends even if he had all
other goods.” Or, as Cicero was to put it a few centuries later, the
great joy and importance of friendship is that it “improves happiness, and
abates misery, by doubling our joys, and dividing our grief.” The literature
of the Greeks and Romans is, of course, replete with many examples of noble and
virtuous friendships, and conversely, the great sin of that culture was to
betray the loyalty of true friendship. The plots of many of the great
tragedies are premised on just such betrayals. Classical writers by and
large regarded friendship as the single highest form of human relationship.
Today we value friends too, yet I fear that our
Facebook culture of friendship pales in comparison to the heights of Athenian
or Roman civilization. Mark Zuckerberg may in some Facebook-sense of the
word have more friends than anyone in the history of the world, but I seriously
doubt that either Aristotle or Cicero would be impressed.
And this brings to mind a story: Prior to
coming to Harvard, I spent several years as a chaplain in an Episcopal school
and, among my assignments, was the task of teaching ethics to middle
schoolers. As any parent knows, adolescence and moral reasoning go
together about as well as oil and vinegar; and yet, there is possibly no time
in life when it is more important to figure out how to make good choices, and
that is particularly true when it comes to choosing friends. And so, I
would spend a good couple of weeks in my ethics course exploring the nature of
friendship, using both classical and Christian sources, in an effort to
convince my students that long before “friend” became a verb involving the
click of a mouse it was a noun denoting a certain quality of human relationship
involving face-to-face encounters over time. One of the simple exercises
I asked my students to complete was to compose a short essay in which they were
to name their best friend and then explain what precisely made this person such
a good friend.
The results were usually both funny and
instructive. A young seventh grade boy whom I will call “Tim” once
submitted this wonderfully succinct essay: “I love Sam as a friend
because he gets me free tickets to Orioles games. I love Sam because he
plays lacrosse with me. I love Sam because he is kind. I love Sam
because we like helping each other.”
What Tim’s little essay lacks in sophistication it
more than makes up for in pedagogic utility because it perfectly illustrated
for the class the key points of Aristotle’s theory of friendship. Any
bond, Aristotle writes, that gives people something in common and brings them
together is a form of philia, or friendship. Sometimes we make
friends with people simply because they are useful to us; they give us
something we need. Thus, Sam is a friend because he gets Tim into Camden
Yards. This may be a slight and meager form of friendship, Aristotle
notes, but it is a type of philia nonetheless. At other times, we
make friends with people because they share an interest with us, a somewhat
firmer and more enduring basis for friendship. Thus, Sam is someone with
whom Tim can enjoy the game of lacrosse. And then there are people with
whom we become friends because of some appealing aspect of their character –
kindness in Sam’s case – and this, for Aristotle, is the firmest foundation for
true friendship. We choose friends well when we choose them not merely
for pleasure or advantage, but because of their character. And finally,
Aristotle observes, true friendship requires reciprocity, a give and take
between two persons of commensurate if not identical gifts. Tim and Sam
are well-suited as friends precisely because they enjoy the back and forth of
teaching and learning together, caring for and sharing with each other, and
being content in each other’s company. In Tim’s words, they enjoy helping
each other.
Aristotle’s theory of friendship, as even this
simple summary shows, is deservedly famous for its rich insights into why we
need and treasure friends, and why friendship is at the heart of human
well-being. And yet, you do not need to study the Nicomachean Ethics
long to see that, from the perspective of the gospels, there is a
problem. For Aristotle’s account of friendship fundamentally rests on a
theory of preferential love: we choose friends based on their very
particular qualities in relation to who we are. We love our friends when
they are able to meet our particular needs, share our particular interests, and
embody the qualities of character we find most appealing. But when we do
that we are necessarily excluding everyone else who do not meet those needs or
criteria. Indeed, Aristotle is quite explicit about this implication,
arguing in terms that we today find offensive that broad categories of folk are
“obviously” incapable of the highest form of human friendship, including women,
slaves, the illiterate and uneducated, the disabled, the physically
unattractive, and other broad bands of humanity failing to conform to
Hellenistic ideals of intelligence, ability, and ethnic and social station.
In this sense, however beautiful Aristotle’s vision of friendship may be within
its own narrow orbit, it is a theory of “contented exclusivity.” And this
is exactly what the Anglican thinker, Jeremy Taylor, was getting at when he quipped:
“When friendships were the noblest things in the world, charity was little.”
In contrast to Aristotle, Jesus’ conception of
friendship in today’s gospel is wildly different: it rests on an
invitation to love our neighbor, whomever he or she may be, as ourselves; to
love even our enemies; and to love all such persons in the same manner as
Christ has loved us. The Good Samaritan does not rush to the aid of only
those persons with whom he has a preferred relationship; indeed, the whole
point of the parable is that he loves and cares for whomever is in need.
Our neighbors are defined by their need, not by their character, qualities, or
interests. In short, the broad trajectory of the gospels, and of our
specific text today, seems to call us to be “friends to the world”: to
love indiscriminately, non-preferentially, and with abandon. For this is
the nature of divine love, or agape.
Here, then, is the crux of the problem for any
Christian account of friendship. On the one hand – and as to this
Aristotle appears to be right – the most precious good in human life seems to
lie in our very particular relationships with those relatively few people we
hold close to our hearts and call our friends, those people with whom we prefer
to share ourselves, to the exclusion of others. And yet, on the other
hand, there is no question that Christ calls us to love everyone without
preference, and extravagantly so. How do we bring these twin ideals
together?
The beginning of an answer to this conundrum is
suggested in a famous exchange recounted in Boswell’s Life of Johnson
between Dr. Johnson and a Mrs. Knowles. Mrs. Knowles was of the view that
friendship is a praiseworthy Christian virtue. Ever one to like a debate,
Dr. Johnson challenges her: “Why, madam, how can that be when all
friendship is preferring the interest of a friend to the neglect of
another? Does not Christianity teach universal benevolence, that we are
to treat our brothers and sisters equally well? And isn’t that contrary
to classical theories of friendship?” Pausing, Mrs. Knowles
replies: “yes, that is true, but it is also true that Jesus picked only
twelve to be his disciples, and of those we are told that one was especially
beloved. What does that tell you?” Taken aback, and uncharacteristically
tongue-tied, Dr. Johnson responds: “You have spoken well, Madam. I
had not thought of that.”
Mrs. Knowles is on to something. While the
gospels certainly teach unconditional and indiscriminate love of neighbor,
these teachings must be read together with the many stories where we see Jesus
expressing such love in the context of particular and very human
relationships: with the twelve; with the beloved disciple of John’s
gospel; with the inner circle of Peter, James, and John; and with the small
group of women disciples with whom Jesus has specific and different kinds of
loving relationships.
The resolution of this tension between the
universal and the particular dimensions of divine love is more formally
explained by St. Augustine in the Confessions. Because we are
finite human beings living at a particular place and time, Augustine observes,
our opportunities to love are necessarily through the particular relationships
of the family and friends we are given. These particular loves are the
means God uses to lead his creatures toward a deeper love of Him and all
humanity. We cannot leap over particular, preferential loves to a love
more universal in scope; indeed, to think we can is a form of hubris, as if we
could love just as God loves. In this sense, our particular friendships
school us in love; they are a sign and a call by which God draws us to a love
more universal in scope. They are the school in which learn what it would
be like to love anyone, and in which, as we mature, we learn to become increasingly
open and available to receive others in love.
Importantly, our particular loves are transcended
but not destroyed in the love of God. It is not as if our closest
relationships are merely a means to an end, to then be discarded. Rather,
there is a triple movement: God uses these relationships both to draw us
more deeply into relationship with Him and then to return us to the delight of
loving our particular friends. But at the same time, we are constantly
beckoned to enlarge our circle of loving, pushing past the contented
exclusivity of Aristotle’s view, in a continuing effort to draw everyone into
God’s love and to eradicate the barriers of gender, race, class, economics, and
other socially constructed systems we humans inevitably erect in our sinful
attempts to contain a divine love that knows no boundaries.
The love of my family and friends sustains and
nourishes me. But these loves also point me to the love of God that makes
them possible. And that love of God in turns invites me to open myself to
love still more and still others.
Augustine may well be right in his analysis of
friendship, and I think he is, but I also appreciate that all of this
high-falutin’ theology is sorely tested when we suddenly lose a friend and
experience the anguish of death. I witnessed this for myself again last
week when I attended the memorial service of Wendy Chang, a Harvard senior who
lived not too far from here in Lowell House and who, just three weeks ago,
ended her own life. Wendy’s heartbreakingly tragic death has cast a long
shadow over the otherwise joyful festivities surrounding the end of the year on
Harvard’s campus.
I did not know Wendy, but showed up at her service
merely to offer what little support I could for those who mourned her
loss. Hundreds of her friends were there, and shared beautiful and often
funny stories of the joy friendship with Wendy brought. Although Wendy
was a Buddhist with a very different understanding of life and death from mine,
as I sat there and heard one poignant story after another from her friends, and
listened to them sing and chant songs of remembrance and lamentation, I could
feel the abiding love that animated her life and that sustained all of those
relationships, even in the midst of the intense pain and awful mystery of that
moment. The vast web of friends that encircled her that day in Memorial
Church was a reflection, I am convinced, of the heavenly choir of angels who
sing to her now. Surely, I prayed, as I sat in my pew, a love powerful
enough to make such friendships possible in this world, and to sustain these
dear friends in their grief, is also powerful enough to overcome death
itself. That, at least, is the Christian hope. And, that is, I think,
what we mean by friendship in Christ. Amen.
A Note on Sources: I am deeply
indebted to my former teacher Gilbert Meilaender for much of what I know about
Christian friendship, particularly Gil's gem of a book Friendship: A Study
in Theological Ethics (South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1985).
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